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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the years it has been interesting to try to identify developing 
trends or theories in the area of oil and gas law. Some trends originate in 
other areas of the law and have migrated toward the oil and gas arena. 
Certain of these trends or theories are developed out of thin air by ingenious 
attorneys representing parties who feel aggrieved. Still others arise as a result 
of new forms of technology and their impact on law and society. Trends even 
evolve from the political arena in response to direct or indirect claims of 
constituents.
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Early forecasting of a trend or theory and the path of its development 
or demise is akin to gazing into a crystal ball or reading tea leaves. 
Unquestionably the birth of a trend causes uncertainty in the law and 
therefore an increased level of risk in the investment community. This paper 
is an attempt to identify several possible trends and surmise whether they will 
result in smooth sailing or a tidal wave of change for the oil and gas industry, 
including attorneys, landmen and the investment community.
While there are a number of potential trends or developing theories, 
many of which I probably have not identified, the following are some of the 
potential developing trends. At this point a caveat is in order. This paper’s 
purpose is to raise questions and give a range of potential answers and/or 
problems. As you will see, this paper is general in nature and is not intended 
to be a treatise or law journal article. While it may seem so, the purpose of 
this paper is not to give the "correct" answer at this point in the evolution of 
these trends.
II. GEOPHYSICAL AND GEOLOGICAL ADVANCEMENTS AND 
THEIR IMPACT UPON THE LAW - TRESPASS, CO TENANCY, 
POOLING. AND THE DOMINATE MINERAL ESTATE__________
Advances in geophysical and geological technology over the last decade 
have been substantial. Geophysical "exploration" takes many forms including
3
seism ic, airborne or satellite technology. It’s purpose is to provide informa- 
tion of the structural and stratigraphic composition of the earth. As you will 
note, I have categorized geophysical activities as "exploration". They are no 
more than another way of exploring for oil and gas. However, geophysical 
operations generally do not determine whether there is oil or gas present. It 
is still necessary that a well be drilled.
The most familiar geophysical operations are seism ic operations. 
Seismic techniques generally involve the generation of energy near the surface 
which reflects subsurface features. They involve either the drilling of shot 
holes with small amounts of explosives or vibrioses with the energy source 
coming from a truck-mounted vibrator. The reflection of these sound waves 
is recorded and in many instances computer enhanced. W hile seism ic has 
been around for years, it has only been within the last score of years that the 
quality has improved dramatically through the use of three dimensional (3-D ) 
seism ic. This movement toward 3-D seism ic often requires larger acreage 
blocks and multiple lines of seismic. Actual use of the land is required in 
both regular seism ic or vibrioses.
Other geology or geologic engineering advancements such as fracking 
(hydraulic fracturing) or horizontal drilling have given rise to new questions
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in the area of oil and gas law. Each of these techniques is another form of 
"exploration".
Fracking is the forcing at high pressure of a fracking material (sand or 
chemical gel) into the potentially productive formation to increase the ability 
of the formation to produce. Horizontal drilling is self-explanatory - it is the 
drilling of a wellbore within and horizontal to the producing formation.
The legal questions arising from the use of each of these "exploration" 
tools are much the same as those which have historically been present. Who 
has the right to do what, where and when and whose permission is needed 
and what is the state’s role through its regulatory agencies?
There is very little, if any, legal authority concerning advanced 
technologies like 3-D seismic, horizontal drilling and fracking. See Kendor 
P. Jones, Restrictions, on Access and Surface/Subsurface Trespass Involving 
Exploration and Production Technologies, in 40 Rockv Mt. Min. L. Inst. 20-1 
(1994). There is, however, general law developed earlier in this century 
dealing with older technology. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Cowden. 241 F.2d 
586 (5th Cir. 1957); Wilson v. Texas Co.. 237 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. Ct. App. 
1951). This law is a patchwork involving the interweaving of the theories of
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trespass, co-tenancy, pooling, and the dominant mineral estate. Appendix A  
to this paper is a visual overview of examples.
The courts have generally held that the mineral owner, not the surface 
owner, has the right to conduct exploration activities whether geophysical or 
geological. 1 Eueene Kuntz. A Treatise On the Law of Oil and Gas § 3.2 
(1987). Generally courts have stated that the right of geophysical exploration 
is a valuable right which belongs to the mineral estate and that the owner of
these rights has an action to protect them. Id. at § 3.2(d)(1), at 91. However, 
the courts have also generally held that no relief is available where there has
been no physical trespass and courts have had great difficulty in determining
the nature and measure of damages. Id. at § 12.7, at 348; Kendor P. Jones, 
Restrictions On Access and Surface/Subsurface Trespass Involving Explora-
tion and Production Technologies, in 40 Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 20-1, 20-28 
(1994). A  key question has and should continue to be whether there was a 
physical trespass on the land.
At this point you might ask what is new about this situation? The 
answer is the way the actual gathering of the information occurs on the 
ground (See Appendix A), the scope of the information revealed and the 
suggestion by some that the courts look beyond the limitations of prior law to 
"create a right". These new rights are generally in the nature of analogies to
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the law of trade secrets, wrongful appropriation or interference with valuable 
property rights. See generally Mark D. Christiansen, Note, Oil and Gas: 
Improper Geophysical Exploration -  Filling In the Remedial Gap. 32 Okla. 
L. Rev. 903 (1979); James W. Griffin, Note, Protectable Property Rights. 
Trade Secrets and Geophysical Data After City of Northglen v. Grynberg, 71 
Denv. U. L. Rev. 527 (1993); Robert J. Rice, Wrongful Geographical 
Exploration. 44 Mont. L. Rev. 53 (1983); Slater, Note, The Surrepitious 
Geophysical Survey: An Interference With Prospective Advantage. 15 Pac. 
L.J. 381 (1984); Thomas M. Warner, Jr., Note, Oil and Gas: Recovery for 
Wrongful Geophysical Exploration -  Catching Up With Technology. 23 
Washburn LJ. 107 (1983). While there are law journal articles proposing 
these arguments, until recently this author is not aware of a case extending 
these theories to geophysical or geological "exploration".
It is my understanding that a trial court judge in Texas in a case 
entitled Burr Ranch v. BGM Airborne Services. Inc. has indicated that he 
may rule based on one of these type theories that a landowner is entitled to 
recovery for airborne geophysical surveys over his property.
With regard to fracking and horizontal drilling techniques I recommend 
a very good discussion in 33 Washburn L. J. 492 (1994) by Jacqueline Lang 
Weaver entitled The Future Course of Oil and Gas Jurisprudence; The
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Politics of Oil and Gas Jurisprudence: The Eighty-Six Percent Factor. This 
article discusses G eo Viking. Inc. v. Tex-Lee Operating Co. 817 S.W.2d 357 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1991) rev'd per curiam, 1992 WL 80263 (Tex. Apr. 22,1992), 
per curiam decision withdrawn and writ of error denied as improvidently 
granted, 839 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. 1992). This case involved a suit by Tex-Lee 
against G eo Viking for failure to properly fracture a well and the concurrent 
loss of oil as a result. This case and the discussion in the referenced article 
certainly place into question what happens if fractures or horizontal drilling 
invade an adjoining mineral estate owned or leased by others. Included in 
this article is a discussion of the policy, consequences and need for the 
appropriate regulatory or legislative changes to encourage new or improved 
technologies like horizontal drilling or fracturing. Other sources of informa-
tion on horizontal drilling trends are Patricia A  Moore, The Legal Implica-
tions of Horizontal Drilling, in  1991 Arkansas Natural Resources Law 
Institute, and Patricia A  Moore, Horizontal Drilling - New Technology 
Bringing New Legal and Regulatory Challenges, in 36 Rocky Mt, Min. L, Inst, 
15-1 (1990).
Under a claim for trespass by fracking an adjoining owner, I assume, 
would have difficulties with the proof of damages and proof of a physical 
invasion. A  valid defense in some circumstances seems to be the rule of 
capture. However, after first examination the rule of capture may not be an
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adequate defense if physical invasion of others properties occurs. I refer you 
to the old slant hole or directional drilling cases. See 1 Howard R. Williams 
& Charles J. Meyers. Oil and Gas Law. § 227 (1990).
Up to this point the discussion has involved rights of the mineral 
owner, and lessee/operator but has not addressed the rights of the surface 
owner. As earlier stated the mineral estate is the dominate estate and has the 
right to make reasonable use of the surface without payment to the surface
owner. 1 Eugene Kuntz. A Treatise On the Law of Oil and Gas § 3.2(a), at 
87-88 (1987). While it has been custom and practice in the industry to pay
the surface owner for shot holes or surface access it has not been compelled
by law. However, recently statutes have been enacted providing for the
possible rights of surface owners for use of the surface and seismic operations.
See Ark Code Ann. §§ 15-71-114, 15-72-213 and 214 and 15-72-203 (1994), 
also see Debbie C. Fritsche, The Inner-Workings of the Arkansas Oil and Gas
Commission, in  1993 Arkansas Natural Resources Law Institute concerning 
some of these statutes and the Oil and Gas Commissions Rules (B-10, B-42). 
With great deference to the authors of these statutes and the regulations, 
many questions remain as to their application including their constitutionality. 
Can the state force an owner to pay a third party for a right that he already 
owns? Do these statutes or regulations attempt to do so? Is that a constitu-
tional taking? Another interesting twist on the enactment of such statutes is
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the question of whether the entering of the state into the arena precludes a 
mineral owner from exercising his rights with regard to unauthorized seismic 
exploration across his minerals. That is, if the seismic company pays the 
surface owner as arguably required by statute, does the fact that the statute 
exists preclude the mineral owner, who has not given permission, from 
recovery? A  sort of preemption argument.
Pooling either voluntary or statutory, especially if inadequate, 
necessarily have a bearing on "exploration" including the use of new 
technology. For example in Reimer v. Gulf Oil Corp., 664 S.W.2d 456 (Ark. 
1984) the Arkansas Supreme Court stated that where a lease provided that a 
well site within the same drilling unit as the lease premises would be 
considered to be located upon the leased premises, a rig could be transported 
across the leased premises to a well site which was located on an adjacent 
tract in the same unit. See also Acree v. Shell Oil Co., 548 F. Supp. 1150, 75 
O.&G.R. 85 (M.D. La. 1982) aff'd, 721 F.2d 524 (5th Cir. 1983). Although 
the general rule is that there is no implied right to use the surface estate of 
a leased tract to benefit operations on an adjacent or nearby tract, a valid 
pooling or unitization order issued by state conservation agency will serve to 
create such a right. 2 Bruce M. Kramer and Patrick H. Martin. The Law of
Pooling and Unitization § 20.06[1] (3d ed. 1990). Such a construction is also 
supported by the fact that these orders are based on the states’ police powers,
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as well as by the fact that courts tend to favor conservation measures. If the 
unit operator were not permitted to use unit lands, the purpose of the state 
conservation order could not be effectuated. A  particular problem arises 
when an unleased tract is located within a forced pool unit. If the pooling or 
unitization order did not, as a matter of law, confer upon the unit operator 
the right to surface access and use of the lands located within the unit, the 
operator’s use of an unleased owner’s land may constitute a trespass, possibly 
exposing the unit operator to both actual and punitive damages. The courts 
that have considered the issue hold that a pooling or unitization order serves 
to insulate an operator from a trespass claim by an unleased owner who has 
been force pooled. The question arises whether such statutes, regulations or 
orders from a conservation agency will protect persons involved in the use of 
enhanced technology. A  problem pointed out in the Weaver article is the 
lack of appropriate statutes, rules and regulations providing for the use of 
enhanced technology.
Other authors note changes in the law concerning the use of the 
surface estate in exploration. John F. Welborn, Changes In the Dom i-
nant/Servient Relationship Between the Mineral and Surface Estate, in 40 
Rocky Mt. Min. L. Inst. 22-1 (1994); William F. Blair, Surface Rights and 
Conflicts: How Dominant is the Mineral Estate, in 1994 Eastern Mineral Law 
Foundation Special Institute. Four Comers and Good Intentions: Construing
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Property Rights Under Oil and Gas Instruments. The W elbom article places 
emphasis on certain changes in federal law which have occurred. The author 
and others have argued that the rights of the surface owner in reference to 
the dominant mineral estate are changing and/or developing to give surface 
owners more rights. However, I do not believe that the changes in these 
federal rules and regulations should be so deemed. They should be viewed 
as a mineral owner placing restrictions upon itself and its lessees as to how 
the mineral estate will be developed with due regard to the surface owner. 
They do, however, show a relevance to the idea that society (as represented 
by government) is giving additional consideration to restrictions on the 
development of minerals in favor of the surface owner. But see Part IV of 
this paper on takings.
A  few states, including Arkansas, have created a duty to restore the 
surface. The majority of jurisdictions hold that an oil and gas lessee or 
mineral owner has no implied obligation to restore the surface. However, the 
Arkansas in Bonds v. Sanchez-O -Brien Oil and Gas Co., 715 S.W.2d 444, 91 
O.&G.R. 11 (Ark. 1986) after recognizing the majority rule held otherwise. 
See also Fox v Nally, 805 S.W.2d. 661 (Ark. Ct. App. 1991) where the court 
held that a damage release does not negate the duty to restore the surface. 
Professors Williams and Myers in their treatise state that there is no implied 
duty of surface restoration as a general matter. 1. Howard R. Williams and
12
Charles J. Myers, Oil and Gas Law. § 218.12 (1990). It may be argued that 
the breach of a regulatory order or statute creates a separate ground for
recovery when recovery would otherwise not be available. However, 
application of these cases to seismic operations where the use of surface is 
limited and short-termed is questionable. If the seismic operation in fact 
created no damage (surface is restored and no collateral damage occurs), then 
what is the surface owner’s basis for recovery? The surface owner may argue
for recovery under Ark. Code Ann. §§ 15-72-213 and 214 and/or 15-71-114 
or 15-72-203 (1994), providing for a surface owner’s lien for damages caused
by operator neglect, a surface owners claim for damages caused by operator 
neglect, permit required for field seismic operations, and notice to surface 
owners. However, do these statutes create a cause of action if there are no 
damages? This and other questions remain unanswered.
III. OPERATING AGREEMENTS, FARMOUT AGREEMENTS, 
DRILLING AND OTHER CONTRACTS AND THE 
ENFORCEMENT OF THEIR PROVISIONS - 
TREND OR NO TREND________________________________
The contractual agreements generally used in the oil and gas industry 
are classified as operating agreements, farmout agreements and drilling 
contracts along with miscellaneous other type contracts. The development of 
the law as it relates to these contracts over the last ten (10) years is difficult 
to categorize. As one can imagine the cases go all over the place with
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different results on similar issues depending on the jurisdiction and court. If 
there is a trend over the past five (5) years the trend would be classified as 
two-pronged. The trend over the more recent years appears to be that courts 
are going to enforce the contracts as written, with limitation. The limitation 
som e courts seem  to be applying is that in certain instances they will try to 
give relief to parties who, when entering contracts, knew they either did not 
intend to, or could not, carry them out. In my humble opinion the limitation 
applied by the courts in these cases is not appropriate.
These cases deal with a variety of operating agreements, farmout 
agreements and drilling contract provisions including the indemnity provisions 
of the operating agreement, the COP AS accounting statement, performance 
of drilling contracts and others.
A  good illustration of this trend is exem plified by two cases from 
Texas. Stine v. Marathon Oil Co. 976 F.2d 254 (5th Cir. 1992) and Dresser 
Industries, Inc. v Page Petroleum. Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. 1993). In Stine 
a non-operator sued the operator, Marathon, for breach of the operating 
agreement. The lower court awarded substantial damages to the non-operator 
based on breach of the operating agreement by the operator. The Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals construed the exculpatory clause found in the 
operating agreement which protects the operator for all action undertaken
14
except those which amount to "gross negligence or willful misconduct". The 
Fifth Circuit stated that the protection extended under the JOA to the 
operator includes all action performed under the JOA including administra-
tive and accounting matters. Stine represents that portion of the trend stated 
as "courts will enforce the contract as written".
However, Dresser Industries represents the "with limitations" portion 
of the trend enunciated above. In Dresser at issue were the provisions of a 
drilling contract and certain releases. The Texas Supreme Court reversed the 
Court of Appeals, holding that the fair notice requirements (consumer 
protection legislation) applicable to indemnity/exculpatory agreements 
applied. This case appears to mean that consumer type protection including 
large or color print or type size are important in joint operating agreements 
and drilling contracts if you want the exculpatory provisions or releases to 
apply.
In criticizing the holding in this case and the underlining anti-indemnity 
legislation I do so without the knowledge of Texas practitioners who have a 
better feel for their meaning and interpretation. See Jeanmarie B. Tade, 
Texas Indemnity, Anti-Indemnity and Contribution Law, in 43 S.W. Inst. 7-1 
(1992). It appears to this writer that while consumers may need such 
protection, persons engaged in the day to day business of the oil and gas
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industry such as drilling contractors, operators and non-operators should be 
bound by their contracts. They should not be relieved because the provisions 
which impact them are not in bold or colored print.
Courts differing approaches to such issues are exemplified by Caddo 
Oil Company, Inc. v. O’Brien 908 F.2d 13 (5th Cir. 1990); Exxon Corporation 
v Crosby-Mississippi Resources. Ltd. 775 F.2d 969 (S.D. Miss. 1991), a ff'd in 
part. 1995 WL 305 (5th Cir. Jan. 3, 1995); Texstar North America, Inc. v. 
Ladd Petroleum Corp., 809 S.W.2d 672, (Tex. Ct. App. 1991), writ denied Oct. 
9, 1991; Petrocana, Inc. v. Amargo, 577 So.2d 274 (La. 1991); Davis v. TXO 
Production Corp., 929 F.2d 1515 (10th Cir. 1991); versus Texas Oil & Gas 
Corporation v. Hawkins Oil & Gas. Inc., 668 S.W.2d 16 (Ark. 1984).
A ll of the cases first set out above enforce the operating agreement or 
contract as written. These cases, in one form or the other, are on the 
opposite end of the spectrum from Hawkins with which many of you are 
familiar. In Hawkins the Arkansas Supreme Court said that there was some 
sort of "fiduciary" duty between an operator and a non-operator. If the court 
in Hawkins wanted to hold as it did it should have done so on other grounds 
rather than establish a fiduciary duty between operators and non-operators. 
The Hawkins case seems to be out of the main stream of cases dealing with
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operating agreements and is another example of the "limitations" placed upon 
the above theory.
Authors writing on the area of joint operating agreements are all over 
the spectrum. Many do not espouse imposing a fiduciary duty, especially 
where the model form JOA is used. See Stine. Exxon. Ernest Smith, The 
Purpose and Effect of the Operating Agreement, in  32 Rocky  Mt. Min. L. 
Inst. 12-1 (1986), Lynn P. Hendrix & Staunton L. T. Golding, The Standard 
of Care in the Operation of Oil and Gas Properties: Does the Operator Owe 
a Fiduciary Duty to Non-Operators?, in 44 S.W. Inst. 10-1 (1993). However, 
other writers state that there should be a fiduciary duty. See Susan Webber 
Wright, Fiduciary Duties Arising From Ownership of Oil and Gas Interests. 
1985 Arkansas Natural Resource Law Institute. Still others are uncertain of 
any conclusion with all the confusion arising from the various cases. See 
David M. Jones, Nonoperators Versus the Operator-Are Nonoperators 
Becoming More Willing To Sue Operators?, in  43 S.W. Inst. 10-1 (1992) for 
a good general discussion.
Courts that find a fiduciary relationship tend to focus on the existence 
of certain attributes which would tend to indicate that it is a joint venture or 
a partnership. The problem with these cases and articles is they often ignore 
the actual terms of the agreement between the parties. Where a model form
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JOA is used these authors and courts completely ignore the provisions which 
provide that it is not a joint venture or partnership, the risk of loss provisions, 
the exculpatory provisions and all of the other matters specifically addressed 
in the operating agreement. Such an approach avoids the intention of the 
parties as exhibited by the agreement, even where the agreement deals with 
the specific problem. In addition these cases and articles also seem  to ignore 
the fact that the parties to the JOA may have originally been competitors or 
adversaries. They may have been integrated and/or forced under an 
operating agreement by competitive factors. The point being, either the 
agreement should be enforced as written or the courts should come up with 
some method of recovery based on something other than changing the theory 
of liability or the relationship of the parties.
Many of the old cases which find that a joint venture existed did not 
involve a form JO A . Therefore those courts were left with the job of figuring 
out if, as a matter-of-fact, there was a joint venture. One can obviously see 
the problem with applying these old joint venture decisions to cases where a 
form joint operating agreement was negotiated. Many times one of the 
included provisions in the JOA is that it is not a joint venture. The reason for 
this is no one wants to be an operator if they are going to be placed under a 
fiduciary obligation which requires them to act against their own best interest 
or to be a guarantor of results. The obvious inference being if a state wants
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to discourage people from being operators then do as the Arkansas Supreme 
Court did. If a state wants to encourage people to become operators, by 
letting the parties know their agreements are binding and can be depended 
upon, then do as other states.
A  second or collateral theory which is present or derivative from the 
Hawkins case and other cases seems to be as follows. Where there is no basis 
in law or the contract the court may impose secondary or collateral duties on 
an operator to achieve a desired result. Both the Hawkins and Dresser 
Industries cases are examples of this.
Claims of bad faith in operating agreement and contract litigation are 
becoming more and more prevalent. See generally Mark Pennington, Punitive 
Damages for Breach of Contract: A  Core Sample From the Decisions of the 
Last Ten Years. 42 Ark. L.R. 31 (1989), [Citing D elta Rice Mill. Inc. v. 
General Foods Corp., 763 F.2d 1001 (8th Cir. 1985) (Interpreting Arkansas 
Law)]. This appears to be a third trend among the cases. The following 
situations, which I categorize as double bad faith, do not arise from the above 
judicial decisions but rather from other cases with which I am familiar.
Over the last ten years there have been a number of cases brought by 
persons whom I classify as "bad actors". These cases typically involved a "bad
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actor" arguing that he is entitled to something, or doesn’t have to pay because 
the operator was grossly negligent or mean or just didn’t do right. It is usually 
alleged that the operator acted in bad faith thus entitling the "bad actor" to 
certain advantages. The advantages are that by claiming bad faith they avoid 
case law to the contrary, invoke equitable principles, claim punitive damages, 
prejudgment interest, attorneys fees and the like. Several examples are 
pertinent. A ll of these are unreported cases which have terminated by some 
series of events with no judicial decision being rendered.
In one case an operating agreement was entered into and, the operator 
drilled the well as required. Unfortunately the target zone was only 
minimumly producible and the costs of a deep well were substantial. The 
non-operator, being in financial difficulty, argued that the operator ruined or 
destroyed the reservoir and did so in bad faith. This argument and others 
were advanced even though the non-operator had promised to pay and had 
in fact paid a minimal amount, but when he saw the results of the log and 
core analysis he decided he would not pay any more. The non-operator 
argued for duties other than those set out in the operating agreement and 
simply tried to avoid the exculpatory provisions of the JOA by arguing bad 
faith. The party attempted to get punitive damages with the possibility of 
prejudgment interest, attorneys fees and the like. The bad faith claim in this 
instance was couched in terms of gross negligence and intentional misconduct.
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After several years of litigation making the same type of claims against several 
operators on different wells, the non-operator eventually went bankrupt.
A  second example deals with the sale of producing properties. The 
"bad actor" had, on several occasions when companies sent out sale letters 
claimed to be interested. He submitted the high bid and when he couldn’t 
produce the money and fulfill the terms of the buy-sell agreement, claimed 
that the seller breached the contract in bad faith. The "bad actor" claimed a 
right to either get the properties for free or extract monetary damages. Such 
a claim obviously delays the ultimate sale of the properties and causes 
additional losses resulting from litigation costs, even if settled.
These are two situations which have occurred which are brought to 
your attention so that you may be prepared if they arise.
IV. THE REAWAKENING OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TAKINGS
CLAUSE - PROPERTY OWNERS REVOLT______________________
A  rapidly growing trend in the natural resource arena involves Article 
V of the Constitution which prohibits governments from taking property with-
out compensation. Article V of the Constitution provides "nor shall private 
property be taken for public use without just compensation". In the last few  
years growing resentment has developed among citizens, including companies
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and individuals as a result of the government’s taking their property through 
laws and regulations, primarily environmental in nature. In just the last 
several months I have noticed no less than five articles in the Wall Street 
Journal detailing new foundations or groups of citizens banding together to 
insist upon their Fifth Amendment Rights under the Constitution. These 
groups generally appear to be private citizens with grievances against the 
government for regulating their property into non-existence. The law as it 
applies to this trend is undergoing a re-emergence.
This trend was last addressed by our U. S. Supreme Court in Lucus v 
South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992) and Dolan v. City of 
Tigard. 114 S.Ct. 2309 (1994). A  number of cases on the takings issue have 
been decided by the Federal courts in recent years. See Florida Rock 
Industries. Inc. v. United States. 8 Cl. Ct. 160 (1985) a ff'd in part and vacated 
in  part, 791 F.2d 893 (1986), and cert. denied. 479 U.S. 1053 (1987). 
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States,r 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990). Two excellent 
articles dealing with this trend are Martha Phillips Allbright and Thomas E. 
Root, Government Taking of Private Water Rights. 39 Rocky Mt. Min. Inst., 
20-1 (1993) and Mark L. Pollot, Making the Right Choices; Strategy. Tactics 
and the Law In Property Rights Cases, in  40 Rocky Mt. Min. L.  Inst., 1-1, 
(1994).
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As a practical matter individual citizens are obviously becoming sick 
and tired of the arrogance of the government in trampling on their rights. 
This government arrogance is reflected in a quote (and inference) out of the 
Allbright and Root article on page 20-4 as follows:
Bruce Babbit, Secretary of the Interior, would replace the 
concept of "multiple use" developed during the use-management 
phase of public land law development with a new concept, that 
of "dominant use." His rationale is as follows: "Multiple Use 
skirts the reality that in the new urbanizing west, there is no 
longer enough space to accommodate every competing use on 
every section of public domain."
The dominate idea behind this attitude is environmentalism has first 
call on the land, and property rights owners be dammed. The property 
owner’s response has been, the Constitution says if you want to take my 
property you have to pay for it. This attitude has been growing over the 
recent years and has been aggravated by the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA), local zoning ordinances and other environmental statutes. A
specific example is the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 et seq. 
(1985) with its impact on logging in the Northwest via the spotted owl. While
many are aware of the above "endangered" specie and others like the
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american burying beetle, the gopher tortus and the red cockaded woodpecker,
they are not aware that many hundreds of other species are in the process of
being classified endangered. Also in this web of regulation is the Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq. (1986), with its wetlands provisions, scenic 
rivers acts and others. Specifically in the oil and gas area, many of you are
familiar with the delay and headache accompanying the discovery of the 
american burying beetle at Fort Chaffee. In other states in this region you 
find similar situations with the red cockaded woodpecker, the gopher tortus 
and others. I am sure that there are likewise many other species in other oil 
and gas producing states. In the south you have the additional problems 
arising from "wetlands" and their effect on operations. Do these statutes, 
regulations and their enforcement constitute a taking of private property 
rights?
An interesting case along these lines out of Michigan is Miller Brothers 
v. D ept. of Natural Resources. 513 N.W.2d 217 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994). In this 
case a regulatory agency would not allow a permit to drill wells in a 4500 acre 
area because of the environment. As a result the operator brought suit under 
the takings clause and was successful in obtaining a judgement in the amount 
of 71 m illion dollars plus interest and attorney fees. The court reasoned that 
by taking away the right to drill several prospects a takings had occurred. The 
court then looking at the value of the potential reserves, found the state had
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taken tins value and was thus obliged to pay. On appeal this approach to the 
calculation of damages (permanent vs temporary) was rejected but the takings 
holding upheld.
Many of you are probably familiar with current litigation and/or 
problems surrounding off-shore leases in Florida and off the east coast where 
takings claims are involved. Another natural resource takings case is Tarrant 
County Water Control and Improvement District Number One v. Haupt, Inc. 
854 S.W.2d. 909 (Tex. 1993). In this case the local water district condemned 
and flooded the surface of certain lands to create a reservoir for drinking 
water. However, the water district did not condemn the mineral interest 
under the lands and the mineral owners filed suit for inverse condemnation. 
The Texas Supreme Court remanded the case for a determination of whether 
there is a reasonable alternative for producing the minerals. If there is not 
a reasonable alternative then inverse condemnation has occurred and the 
mineral estate must be paid for.
This area of the law will continue to unfold with additional cases 
pending before the U. S. Supreme Court and other courts as well as a new 
congress possibly undertaking a reduction of government regulation.
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V. E N T E R PRISE LIABILITY - A CLAIM WITHIN A THEORY
An interesting concept is beginning to make rumblings in the natural 
resources area. This theory is enterprise liability. There are topics on this 
theory planned for the upcoming Eastern Mineral Law Foundation Annual 
Institute. See generally Timothy J. Gillick, The Essence of Enterprise 
Liability, or the True Meaning of "We’re All In This Together”, 16 Forum 979 
(1981); Tort Reform Symposium: Perspectives on the American Law 
Institute’s Reporters’ Study on Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury. 
30 San Diego L. Rev. 213 (1993) for example. It is my understanding that this 
theory is somewhat as follows. If a person or people are injured then 
everyone in the chain of commerce is responsible for that injury. For 
example, in the energy area, parties all the way from mineral owners through 
exploration companies, producers, purchasers and end users could be 
responsible for damages arising to parties anywhere in the chain of commerce. 
This is no doubt an interesting societal/political claim. It will be interesting 
to see if it develops. However, it seems if everyone is liable in some form or 
fashion for everything that happens everywhere to anybody then we should all 
have a cause of action against each other for everything and as a result 
everything will washout. The only problem is that plaintiffs’ lawyers will own 
1/3 of all commerce.
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VI  ROYALTY ON TAKE OR PAY SETTLEMENTS OR CONTRACT
BUYDOW NS___________________________________________________
There is a pending trend of cases involving royalty owners claims to 
proceeds on take or pay settlements or gas contract buy-downs. This type 
claim was addressed in the Bruni decision out of Texas where the Texas 
Supreme Court held that royalty owners were not entitled to relief. Killiam 
Oil Company v. Bruni, 806 S.W.2d 264 (Tex Ct. App 1991) error denied sub 
nom. Hurd Enterprises. Ltd. v. Bruni, 828 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. Ct. App 1992). 
The Frey decision out of Louisiana held that royalty owners are entitled to 
part of the proceeds of take or pay claims or contract buy-downs. Frey v. 
Amoco Production Co. 943 F. 2d 578 (5th Cir. 1991), withdrawn in part 951 
F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1992), certifying questions to 603 So.2d 166 (La 1992). In 
Arkansas Klein v. Jones. 980 F.2d 521 (8th Cir. 1992) ren’g denied Jan. 22, 
1993, is ongoing and I will not report on it assuming that it will be reported 
on under the recent developments part of the program later. It is my 
understanding that there are other cases pending or in the process of being 
readied on this issue in other states. It will be interesting to watch the 
development of these cases to see if there is a trend one way or the other. 
In the meantime you may want to review these three decisions in order to be 
better prepared.
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V I I . CONCLUSION
In junior high school one of my teachers was fond of saying "the first 
sign of intelligence is the ability to follow directions". My instructions were 
to write and present a paper of this type for the benefit of the audience. I 
think I have followed the instructions and given you something useful. This 
same teacher often followed her first statement with "the second sign of 
intelligence is the ability to identify the question or problem". I believe I have 
identified som e of the possible future trends and the problems they may cause 
for the oil and gas industry be they landmen, attorneys, geophysical personnel, 
or companys with investments in this industry.
This paper identifies five (5) potential legal trends concerning the oil 
and gas industry. While this paper does not attempt to give you the correct 
answer it does provide general legal principles to the extent they exist on 
these areas. Hopefully each of us can take these general principles and 
formulate a proper application if the situation arises. In law school credit is 
given for correctly identifying the question, the pertinent facts and the law, 
even if the answer is wrong. Unlike law school, if we apply these principles 
incorrectly I am sure the courts, with no hesitancy, will let us know.
428/paper.wew
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APPENDIX "A"
1. All 2. None 3. Surface - Yes, Minerals - No
4. Surface - Yes, Minerals - No 5. Surface - Yes, Minerals - 1/2
6. Surface - No, Minerals - Yes

